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A Fair Share - 
Burden-Sharing Preferences in the United States and China 
 
Fredrik Carlsson, Mitesh Kataria, Alan Krupnick, Elina Lampi, 





Using a choice experiment, we investigated preferences for distributing the economic 
burden of decreasing CO2 emissions in the two largest CO2-emitting countries: the United 
States and China. We asked respondents about their preferences for four burden-sharing rules 
to reduce CO2 emissions according to their country’s 1) historical emissions, 2) income level, 
3) equal right to emit per person, and 4) current emissions. We found that U.S. respondents 
preferred the rule based on current emissions, while the equal right to emit rule was clearly 
least preferred. The Chinese respondents,  on the other hand,  preferred  the historical rule, 
while the current emissions rule was the least preferred. Respondents overall favored the rule 
that was least costly for their country. These marked differences may explain the difficulties 
countries face in agreeing how to share costs, presenting a tough hurdle to overcome in future 
negotiations. We also found that the strength of the preferences was much stronger in China, 
suggesting that how mitigation costs are shared across countries is more important there.  
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1.  Introduction 
By now, the  difficulties  in  forging an international agreement  on  an effective 
international climate  policy  are well known. With the 15th  Conference of the Parties  in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, yet another meeting closed without a settlement on binding 
targets. Instead,  the outcome of the meeting is the Copenhagen Accord,  where countries 
volunteer to pledge to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that 
they will cut emissions until 2020.  
Why is it so difficult for countries to agree on binding targets? Some  of many 
plausible explanations are that different burden-sharing rules have different economic impacts 
on individual countries that the negotiators are sensitive to domestic public opinion, and that 
they want to insure the rules are “fair” to their country (see, e.g., Lange et al. 2007). Driven 
strictly by self-interest, climate negotiators from developing countries can thus be expected to 
support burden-sharing rules that favor poor countries, while their counterparts from rich 
countries will be equally tactical and support rules that cater to their interests. Citizens often 
adopt opinions that defend the reputation or interests of their country. A critical issue, 
therefore, is what citizens perceive as a fair distribution of the economic burden of decreasing 
CO2  emissions among countries—in other words,  their preferences for different burden-
sharing rules.  
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this issue by presenting the results of a 
choice experiment  that  elicited  preferences for different burden sharing rules, conducted 
among ordinary citizens in the United States and China. We focus on these countries because 
they are world’s largest CO2-emitting countries  and are critical to  the  outcome of any 
negotiations to reduce emissions. If the people of these two countries are prone to evaluate 
their country more positively in relation to other countries—have an in-group bias (Tajfel 
1982)—then this can affect the potential to reach agreement. Similarly, they can also exhibit a 
group-serving bias—distorted beliefs about their group—which is similar to a self-serving 
bias
 1
While there is a vast literature on burden-sharing rules, it is mostly on a country or 
negotiator level. The country-level studies are often either an assessment of burden-sharing 
rules (comparing and ranking them) or based on game theory, discussing what is rational 
 (see, e.g., Festinger 1957; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997; Konow 2000), except that it 
takes place between groups instead of individuals. At the same time, these two countries are 
very different in their ability to pay, which might also have affected how citizens responded to 
the survey.  
                                                           
1 Some researchers simply use the term “fairness-bias,” which can be viewed as a combination of two joint 
effects, both a self-centered bias that is a discrepancy that the stakeholder is aware of, and a self-serving bias that 
is a distortion of the stakeholders’ beliefs that is subconscious and drives perception of what is fair (Johansson-
Stenman and Konow 2010). With climate policy, these two effects would reinforce one another. 
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behavior for a country or coalition of countries (see, e.g., Butraw and Toman 1993; Rose et al. 
1998;  Cazorla and Toman 2000;  Ringius et al. 2002;  Torvanger and Ringius 2002;  and 
Torvanger and Godal 2004). Other studies have focused on the preferences of the negotiators, 
such as Lange et al. (2007) and Dannenberg et al. (2010).  
Dannenberg et al. (2010) showed  (in a simple non-strategic game,  not related  to 
climate change) that climate negotiators are inequality averse and that there are no significant 
differences in inequality aversion between negotiators from different regions. However, as the 
authors remarked, it is likely that negotiators are affected by public opinion  at home, in 
addition to their own preferences for equality. There are also articles discussing the ethical 
aspects of burden-sharing rules (see, e.g., Miller 2004; Posner and Sunstein 2007; Klinsky and 
Dowlatabadi 2009). However, we argue that the outcome of future climate negotiations will 
ultimately depend on how politically acceptable the agreement  is  to the domestic 
constituencies in the affected countries.  
The burden-sharing rules discussed in the literature can be traced back, in general, to 
the basic principles of distributive justice: equity, equality, and need (Adams 1965, 267–99; 
Deutsch 1975; Tyler et al. 1997).  It seems that most countries appeal to some general 
principles of justice,  but since there are several competing principles that give different 
results, this does not necessarily facilitate the negotiation process.
2
Previous to our study,  Cai  et  al.  (2010)  also  analyzed  how the distributional 
consequences of climate change policies influence policy preferences. However, their study 
included college students living in the United States and Canada and did not explicitly name 
any burden-sharing rules.  They found that distributional consequences are important to 
respondents and can largely affect willingness to pay (WTP).
 Based on the literature 
concerning burden-sharing rules in relation to international climate negotiations (see, e.g., 
Rose et al. 1998; Torvanger and Ringius 2002; Ringius et al. 2002; Lange et al. 2007), the 
burden-sharing rules we study are cost proportional to 1) historical emissions (burden sharing 
based on historical responsibility), 2) income level (burden sharing based on capacity to pay), 
3) equal right to emit (burden  sharing based on need), and 4) current emissions  (burden 
sharing based on current responsibility). 
3
                                                           
2 Equity theory is based on the justice principle that reward should be in proportion to contribution. For example, 
someone who works two hours should earn twice as much as someone working one hour. With a need-based 
principle, the ones with the greatest need receive the most; with an equality principle, resources are divided 
equally between individuals. 
  
3 Instead of naming any burden-sharing rules, Cai et al. (2010) asked their respondents to rate how mitigation 
costs should be allocated among various domestic payers (individual taxpayers, consumers, energy users, 
industry, energy producers, and government) and international payers (industrialized countries; countries of the 
former Soviet Union; densely populated countries, such as China and India; United States and its major trading 
partners; developing countries, which are beginning to pollute heavily; smaller developing countries; and 
countries in proportion to their pollution) . 
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The main contribution of our study is that we use identical surveys of representative 
citizens  in both  the  United  States  and China  to  estimate  willingness to pay and  elicit 
preferences for different burden-sharing rules.  Our main finding shows  quite distinct and 
dramatically counterpoised preferences for burden-sharing among U.S. and Chinese citizens. 
In particular, U.S. citizens prefer the rule that is most advantageous for the United States, but 
simultaneously is the least advantageous—or most costly—for the Chinese.  Chinese 
preferences are almost a mirror image: rules that favor China and happen to disfavor the 
United  States  are preferred. This suggests that there is group-serving  bias among both 
American and Chinese respondents, in that they strongly prefer rules that are advantageous to 
their respective countries.  
Also, in the Chinese results, we found that the preferences are very strong, suggesting 
that they reflect deeply held views concerning perceived fairness. Since the total costs to be 
divided are considerable,  this  implies  that negotiations will be difficult and protracted. 
Considering the issues and costs at stake, we believe that countries should make a careful and 
sustained effort to understand each other’s  preferences as a first step in international 
negotiations.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the survey and the 
sampling framework. In section 3, the results of the choice experiment are presented. Section 
4 concludes the paper.  
2. Description of the Survey  
The survey consisted of four independent sections. In the first section, we elicited 
general attitudes about climate change. The main purpose of this section was to discover 
whether the respondents believe that climate change is occurring and if they believe that 
actions can be taken to reduce or stop the change. In the second section, the survey provided 
information on the effects of climate change, summarized from the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report. Respondents’ attitudes towards reducing global CO2 emissions were also elicited in 
this section. In the last part of section 2, a number of WTP questions for different reductions 
of CO2 emissions were asked using a payment card.
 4
                                                           
4 Although it is possible that the contingent valuation questions can affect the responses to the choice 
experiment, we believe that it was actually advantageous to include the WTP questions on the levels of CO2 
reductions before our experiment. In this way, it was clear to the respondents that the choice experiment did not 
concern the level of the reduction, and they had already had the opportunity to express their preferences for this. 
Moreover, since we used a payment card in the contingent valuation questions, there is less risk of a direct 
anchoring bias. We therefore decided to keep the order of these two different sections the same in all survey 
versions, even if it meant that we could not test for an order effect. 
 (The results of this section are reported 
in Carlsson et al. 2010). The third section of the survey contained the choice experiment 
regarding the rules for allocating the responsibilities for the cost of CO2 reductions across 
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countries, which is the focus of this paper. Finally, section 4 of the survey contained questions 
about the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics. 
In the choice experiment, we emphasized to the respondents that they should choose 
allocation (or burden-sharing) rules, given a 60 percent reduction of emissions. We did this to 
avoid confounding preferences for the different rules with preferences for different levels of 
reductions and to make clear that the total global costs are unaffected. More specifically, we 
gave the following instructions to the respondents: 
Reducing CO2 emissions is costly, and an important question is how costs should be shared 
among countries. Suppose that countries have reached an international agreement that global 
reductions of CO2 emissions should be 60 percent. We will now present four alternative 
“rules” for distributing the costs among countries to achieve this reduction. All four rules 
would result in the same cost to the world economy, but different costs to different countries. 
In the choice experiment, the respondents chose between  two alternatives in each 
choice situation, where the alternatives differed with respect to the burden-sharing rule and 
the cost to the household. Each respondent answered four choice sets. The burden-sharing rule 
attribute had four possible levels, as noted above (historical emissions, ability to pay, equal 
right to emit, and current emissions). While more rules could have been developed, we felt 
additional rules would have excessively increased the cognitive burden to respondents. Also, 
these four are the main rules in the literature.
5
The other attribute, household cost per month until 2050, had four levels based on the 
results of pilot studies in both China and the United States. Examples of the typical ways in 




                                                           
5 We also limited the discussion to CO2 emissions, instead of all greenhouse gases, to make the survey 
cognitively less demanding for the respondents. 
 Both the monthly and annual costs for a household were shown to ensure that the 
respondents understood how much they had to pay. The attribute levels are summarized in 
table 1. The costs were presented in U.S. dollars for the U.S. sample and in yuan for the 
Chinese sample; the table, however, reports PPP-adjusted US$ values for China (yuan 3.4 = 
$1). 
6 Wiser (2007) found that the WTP to support climate change policy depends on the payment vehicle used in the 
study. For example, with a collective payment mechanism, the elicited WTP is higher, compared to using 
voluntary payment mechanisms. In our study, we did not test for different payment vehicles, but rather made 
clear how the payments would be made and kept this consistent across countries. 
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Table 1     Attributes  
Attributes   Description 
Income level (ability to pay)  Countries with high income levels must pay a larger share of the costs than 
countries with low income levels. This option says that countries with greater 
ability to pay should pay more. 
Emissions level today  Countries with currently high emissions levels must pay a larger share of the 
costs than countries with currently low emissions levels. This option says that 
those countries that are currently a larger part of the problem should pay more. 
Historical emissions level  Countries with a history of high emissions levels must pay a larger share of the 
costs than countries with a history of lower emissions. This option recognizes 
that CO2 builds up in the atmosphere over many years. Thus, countries with a 
history of high emissions should pay more because they caused more of the 
problem. 
Equal right to emit (need)  All countries have a right to emit an equal amount of emissions per person. 
Countries with emissions per person greater than an agreed amount must pay; 
and they must pay more the higher their emissions per person are. 
Yearly cost for the household 
until year 2050 in US$) 
U.S.: $168, $240, $288, $336  
China: $159, $229, $300, $318  
 
In order to illustrate more clearly to the respondent what the four burden-sharing rules 
imply, we created four groups relating to country income and current emissions. How much 
each group would pay differs, depending on which rule is used to distribute the costs of 
reducing CO2  emissions.  In table  2,  we show  different distributions  of costs under each 
alternative rule and also provide information about the world population share of each group.
7
                                                           
7 The data on income and emissions come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009). 
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Table 2     Information of the Effect of the Four Burden-Sharing Rules 
    Distribution of costs according to attributes 
Country groups 
by income and 
current 
emissions level 

















   
Countries with 
































low income and 
medium 
emissions (e.g., 



























As can be seen in table 2, only 13 percent of the world’s population lives in the high-
income and very-high-emissions countries; however, their shares of the costs are much larger 
for all the rules. On the other hand, 40 percent of the world’s population lives in the low-
income and low-emissions countries, but their share of the costs is much smaller for all rules 
(ranging from 0  percent  to 8  percent, depending on the rule).  In particular, the rule on 
historical emissions has the lowest cost for China, while the rule generating its highest cost is 
based on current emissions. Exactly the opposite is true for the United States: the rule with the 
lowest cost is based on current emissions, and the rule with the highest cost is historical 
emissions. (An example of a choice set is given in the appendix, in table A2.) 
The choice sets were created with a linear D-optimal design principle (Huber and 
Zwerina 1996; Carlsson and Martinsson 2003). In total, 16 choice sets were generated, with 
two alternatives in each set. After random blocking, each respondent was presented with four 
choice sets. Hence, we had four versions of the survey applied at random. 
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A standard concern when using a choice experiment  (or other stated preference 
method) is the risk of hypothetical bias. The empirical evidence of hypothetical bias in a 
choice experiment is mixed (see, e.g., Carlsson and Martinsson 2001; Lusk and Schroeder 
2004; Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 2008). To reduce the probability of a hypothetical 
bias, following Carlsson et al. (2005) and List et al. (2005), we used a cheap-talk script, as 
follows: 
Before making your choices, please consider how an increased cost would affect your ability 
to buy other things. Previous studies of this kind have shown that people claim to be willing to 
pay more money than they actually would in a real situation. It is important to us that 
respondents answer these questions as truthfully as possible.  
2.1  Administration of the U.S. and Chinese Surveys 
The surveys were conducted in November and December 2009. The questionnaire was 
designed with the aid of 10 focus groups across the two countries. Careful attention was given 
to develop a survey that was understandable and credible. The survey was also designed to be 
self-administered on the computer to eliminate interviewer bias and strategic answering to 
please the interviewer. In China, the survey was conducted on laptops in special rooms with 
invited respondents. In the United States, the respondents took the survey online. The survey 
yielded 909 responses in the United States and 1,264 responses in China.  
The Chinese survey was administered in four cities—Shanghai, Nanning, Jiujiang, and 
Chongqing—chosen by the Chinese Ministry of the Environment as being representative of 
Chinese cities in size, location,  and income. Respondents were randomly selected to 
participate in the survey via  neighborhood-based databases used in previous surveys 
(Krupnick  et al.  2010).
8 The respondents in the U.S.  survey were reached by  a survey 
company, Knowledge Networks. The participants were recruited by telephone, using random 
digit dialing and address-based sampling, and are representative of the U.S. population for 
gender, age, race, and income. Participants aged 18 years and older were randomly selected 
and invited to take the survey.
9
2.2  Characteristics of Respondents 
  
Descriptive statistics of the U.S. and Chinese samples are presented in table 3. There 
are some differences in the distribution of the socioeconomic characteristics between the two 
countries. In particular, the share of subjects with a university education is high in the Chinese 
                                                           
8 This is a registration system used by local communities to provide reproductive service to married couples. 
Older people are also reached by this system because so many young married couples live with their parents. 
9 To obtain a more representative panel, if a household does not have a computer and/or internet, Knowledge-
Networks provides a laptop computer and free internet access. 





                                                           
10 The share of people (for example, in Beijing) with a university education is around 20% (Beijing Statistical 
Yearbook 2009), while in our sample, 42.8% have a university education. 
 A number of attitudinal responses are also reported in the table. Notably, 23 percent 
of the citizens in the United States believe that the temperature has not increased globally, 
while in China only 5 percent of the respondents believe this.  
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Table 3     Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Description 
USA  China 
Mean  Min.  Max.  Mean  Min.  Max. 
Female  = 1 if female  0.520  0  1  0.464  0  1 
University educ.  = 1 if completed university education  0.308  0  1  0.430  0  1 
Income  Monthly income in US$ ‘000 
(Std. dev.) 
3.407 
(2.812)  0.208  16.67 
1.250 
(0.864)  0.123  3.92 
Low income  =1 if household belongs to low-income group  0.220  0  1  0.208  0  1 
Medium income  =1 if household belongs to medium-income group  0.549  0  1  0.564  0  1 
High income  =1 if household belongs to high-income group  0.231  0  1  0.228  0  1 
Use tax money in US/China  =1 if tax money should primarily be used in own country  0.443  0  1  0.560  0  1 
Own country should reduce   =1 if own country should decrease CO2, if other countries do 
not  0.709  0  1  0.799  0  1 
No global temperature 
increase 
=1 if respondent believes temperature has not increased 
globally  0.232  0  1  0.045  0  1 
Democrats  = 1 if Democrat (U.S.)  0.375  0  1       
Republican  =1 if Republican (U.S), reference category  0.245           
Green party   = 1 if Green party (U.S.)  0.011  0  1       
Other party  = 1 if other party (U.S.)  0.083  0  1       
Independent  = 1 if independent (U.S.)  0.286  0  1       
No. of respondents    909      1,264     




To analyze the responses, we apply a standard random utility framework and estimated a 
random parameter logit model, where the choice depends on the two attributes of the choice 
experiment. The burden-sharing rules attribute is effects-coded, so we can directly compare all 
the rules with each other and between the two countries.
 11
Since there are large income differences within both countries, we estimate three separate 
cost coefficients for low-, medium- and high-income respondents. Low-income respondents are 
those belonging to the 20  percent  of  the  sample with the lowest income, and high-income 
respondents are those belonging to the 20 percent of the sample with the highest income. These 
three income coefficients are assumed to be fixed, which means that marginal utility of income is 
constant within each income group.  
 The three coefficients associated with 
the burden-sharing rule attribute are assumed to be normally distributed. Since respondents made 
several choices, we assume that the random parameters are constant across tasks for a given 
respondent.  
In addition, in order to investigate the WTP for different respondent groups, we interact 
the random parameters with a set of household characteristics and attitudinal variables (see table 
3). The models are estimated with simulated maximum likelihood using Halton draws with 500 
replications. (See Train 2003 for details.) The coefficients of the random parameter models are 
presented in the appendix, in table A3, and WTP results are in table 4.  
Table A3 also shows, in the U.S. case, that the estimated standard deviation for the ability 
to pay rule is significant,  indicating differences in unobservable preferences for that rule; 
however,  the standard deviations for the historical  emissions and the need rules are not 
significant. The results of the Chinese sample show larger unobservable preference heterogeneity 
as the standard deviations are significant for all three rules. In order to compare the relative 
importance of the various burden-sharing rules between the two countries, we focus on the 
estimated WTP for the rules. The WTP is simply the ratio of the effect-coded attribute 
coefficient and the cost coefficient.  
 
                                                           
11 “Effects-coded” means that instead of normalizing the WTP to zero for one of the attribute levels, we normalized 
the sum of WTP to zero (see, e.g., Louviere et al. 2000). 
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3.1  Willingness to Pay for the Four Burden-Sharing Rules 
The estimated WTP in PPP-adjusted US$ values for the burden-sharing rules are reported 
in table 4.
12 The first column recapitulates the essential characteristics of each rule—its implied 
burden for the two country groups to which the United States and China belong, respectively. 
Since the estimated models included a set of interactions, we calculated WTP at sample means; 
the standard errors are estimated using the Delta-method.
13 For the Chinese sample, the estimates 
are made at the population mean for the share of university educated since our sample contained 
considerably more university educated than the population share.
14
Table 4     Annual Household WTP in PPP-Adjusted U.S. Dollars for the United States and China 
 
Burden-sharing rule  USA  China 
Historical emissions 















Ability to pay 















Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*,
 **,
 *** denote WTP statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
There are very large differences in the level of WTP between the United  States  and 
China:  Chinese respondents have on average considerably higher WTP  for distributive 
preferences than U.S. citizens. This is a remarkable result, given that Chinese incomes are about 
one-third of U.S. incomes on average. This could be because U.S. respondents do not have a 
strong preference for the burden-sharing rules or that many of them, as a way of protesting 
against the survey, ignored the burden-sharing rules. At the same time, our major interest is not 
in the absolute level of WTP, but the preferences for the burden-sharing rules and the 
comparison between countries with respect to the ranking of the rules.  
                                                           
12 Yuan 3.4 = US$ 1 at the time of the survey. 
13 For the U.S. sample, the absolute value of the cost coefficient decreases with increasing income. This means that 
there is a larger disparity in WTP among the burden-sharing rules for the high-income groups because the WTP is 
the ratio between the attribute coefficient and the cost coefficient. For the Chinese sample, the absolute value of the 
cost coefficient is actually lowest for the low-income group, which means that they have the largest disparity in 
WTP across the rules.  
14 This adjustment does not have any major impact on the estimated WTP measures. Unweighted results are 
available upon request. 
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The ranking of the burden-sharing rules are very different—almost opposite—in the two 
countries. For the Chinese respondents, the ranking of the rules in terms of WTP is the same as 
the ranking of the rules in terms of the costs for the country (see table 2). They have the strongest 
preference for the rule based on historical  emissions,  which means  the lowest costs for the 
country, while the current emissions rule is least preferred (i.e., the most expensive rule for 
China). U.S. respondents have, on the other hand,  the strongest preference for the current 
emissions rule, followed by the ability to pay rule; the need-based rule is the least preferred one. 
Thus, U.S. respondents also rank the preferences in accordance to the cost for their own country, 
at least to some extent. The two most preferred rules are the ones that result in the lowest cost for 
the United States. However, the least preferred rule, the need rule, is actually less costly than the 
second least preferred rule.  
Nevertheless, the two countries are similar in that their respondents express preferences 
that are strongly correlated with how advantageous a particular rule is for their country. Since the 
countries have opposite characteristics in terms of income and historical emissions, the same 
type of group-serving bias would actually lead to opposite preferences in terms of the rules 
offered.  
This finding could explain the difficulties in reaching agreement on the same rule in any 
negotiation regarding reduction of CO2  emissions. The difficulty is reinforced by the huge 
difference in the WTP for the Chinese respondents. The WTP difference between the historical 
and current emissions rules in the Chinese sample is about $300 (while the difference for the 
United  States  is about $44);  $300  corresponds  to around  2  percent  of the annual  average 
household income of the Chinese sample.
15
Carlsson et al. (2010) estimated the annual WTP for decreasing the global CO2 emissions 
by 60 percent (compared to business as usual) until 2050 to be around $340 in the United States, 
and around $100 in China. (This study is based on the same sample and survey as this one.) 
Thus, the WTP values for reducing emissions are considerably larger than the WTP values for 
different rules in the United States. In China, however, we find that the WTP for one principle, 
Although the WTP values are considerably higher in 
China than in the United States, the relative differences between the WTP estimates across all 
four rules is about the same: in both countries, the WTP for the most preferred rule is about twice 
as big as for the least preferred rule, and the rule ranked as the second best has a WTP about half 
the size of that for the highest ranked rule. 
                                                           
15 Two percent seems quite high. Possible explanations for this finding include 1) a large amount of income goes 
unreported in the Chinese sample; and 2) unfamiliarity with, and disbelief in, the ability of the government to collect 
or otherwise levy costs they were being asked to pay 
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compared to another, is as big as the WTP for the climate issue itself. This means that the 
Chinese feel very strongly about what they perceive as fair rules!  
3.2  Willingness to Pay for Different Respondent Groups 
In this section, we discuss differences in WTP and ranking of the rules between different 
groups of respondents  within each country.  The coefficients and standard deviations of the 
random parameter model with the interactions are reported in the appendix, in table A3. Table 5 
presents the WTP estimates for the different groups of respondents. 
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Table 5   Annual Household Willingness to Pay in PPP-Adjusted U.S. Dollars for Different 
Respondent Groups  
Rules 
United States  China 
Male  Female  t-test:  
p-value
† 






*  -7.4  0.659  112.7
***  174.6
***  0.025 
Need  -24.8
***  -19.8
***  0.540  -58.7
***  -99.4
***  0.087 
Ability to Pay  10.0  8.8  0.888  91.7
***  88.6
***  0.898 
Current emissions  25.7
***  18.4
**  0.380  -145.7
***  -163.9
***  0.631 
  No university  University  t-test:  
p-value
† 






***  0.092  138.3
***  153.8
***  0.570 
Need  -21.2
***  -24.4
***  0.804  -86.3
***  -42.3
***  0.066 
Ability to pay  9.8
*  8.6  0.859  96.7
***  64.6
***  0.199 
Current emissions  16.3
***  34.3
***  0.048  -148.6
***  -176.2
***  0.472 
  Use tax money in US  t-test:   Use tax money in China  t-test: 
  Do not agree  Agree  p-value





***  -2.7  0.175  160.5
***  126.4
***  0.216 
Need  -16.5
***  -29.3
***  0.147  -101.4
***  -58.8
***  0.075 
Ability to pay  13.0
**  4.9  0.384  116.6
***  69.6
***  0.062 
Current emissions  17.7
***  27.1
***  0.291  -175.6
***  -137.2
***  0.318 
  Own country should reduce  t-test:  Own country should reduce  t-test: 
  Do not agree  Agree  p-value




-8.4  -9.4  0.921  166.3
***  135.1
***  0.370 
Need  -35.7
***  -16.6
***  0.068  -103.1
***  -71.1
***  0.287 
Ability to pay  17.2
*  6.2  0.325  152.7
***  74.5
***  0.017 
Current emissions  26.9
***  19.8
***  0.505  -215.9
***  -138.6
***  0.123 
  Temperature has increased  t-test:  Temperature has increased  t-test: 
  Do not agree  Agree  p-value





***  0.952  143.8
**  141.3
***  0.969 
Need  -40.6
***  -16.6
***  0.026  -98.3
*  -76.6
***  0.713 
Ability to pay  15.8  7.5  0.471  173.3
**  86.3
***  0.181 
Current emissions  33.5
***   18.4
***  0.180  -228.8
**  -151.1
***  0.495 
†  P-values for the t-tests of equal WTP between the categories. 
*,
 **,
 *** denote WTP is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Except for political preferences (which are discussed in more detail below), in the U.S. 
sample, there are no differences between any of the groups with respect to the ranking of the 
burden-sharing rules. For example, both males and females in the United States rank the current 
emissions rule as the best principle, and the need rule as least preferred. However, there are 
differences in the magnitudes of the WTPs across the different respondent groups. University-
educated  participants  have  a significantly higher WTP for the current emissions rule and a 
significantly lower WTP for the historical emissions rule, compared with other respondents. 
Thus, there is a group-serving  bias in the United  States, which  is even stronger among the 
university educated, perhaps because they are more accurate in assessing all of the numbers.  
Attitudes towards climate policy also affect the levels of WTP to a large extent in the 
U.S. sample. Both those who do not think that “the United States should decrease their CO2 level 
if other countries won’t”  and  those who “do  not  agree that the temperature has increased 
globally” have significantly lower WTP for the need rule, a rule that favors several of the E.U. 
countries, India, and countries in Africa.  
While gender has no significant impact on the size of the WTP  in the U.S. sample, 
females living in China have significantly higher WTP for the historical emissions rule and 
significantly lower WTP for the need rule, compared to male respondents. Also, attitudes seem 
to play a role in explaining the level of WTP (although attitudes and WTP may be two related 
ways of expressing preferences). Those who agree with the opinion that tax money should not be 
primarily used to reduce CO2 in China appear to like the ability to pay rule (which is most costly 
for the European Union) more than those who want tax money to be primarily used in their own 
country.  
Finally, the preferences of those who believe that the global temperature has increased 
and those who do not believe it do not significantly differ in the Chinese sample, while the U.S. 
respondents who are skeptical about climate change have significantly lower WTP for the need 
rule. This rule favors European Union and poor developing countries and is the second most 
expensive rule for the United States. 
We also estimated two additional models where the burden-sharing attribute coefficients 
were  interacted  with political preferences of the respondents.  The coefficients and standard 
deviations of the random parameter model with these interactions are reported in the appendix, in 
table A4, for the U.S. sample. For the Chinese sample, all interaction terms were insignificant: 
there  were  no significant differences in WTP between members and non-members of the 
communist party, so we do not report any results from that model. The WTP estimates for the 
various groups in the United States are reported in table 6. 
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Table 6    Annual Household WTP in PPP-Adjusted U.S. Dollars for Different Political Affiliations in 
the U.S. Sample 
Burden-sharing 
rule 












Ability to pay  -2.1  16.6
*  11.6  -55.6  33.6
** 
Current emissions  17.1
**  39.2
***  19.8
**  -47.7  8.0 
*,
 **,
 *** denote WTP is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 6 shows that political preferences do have a clear impact on the WTP for the 
burden-sharing rules. Both the ranking of the rules and the size of the WTPs vary across the 
different U.S. political parties. Green party supporters are most different from the others, not 
only in environmental attitudes but also with burden sharing. They rank the need rule as most 
preferred, and the current emissions rule as least preferred. However, their WTP estimates are 
not statistically significant, probably due to the very small sample size of the Green party.  
We also find that the preferences of independent voters are more similar to Republicans 
than to Democrats.  Most of the differences in WTP among the different voters are not 
significantly different from zero using two-sided t-tests. However, Republicans have 
significantly different WTP than Democrats for three out of four principles. Furthermore, the 
difference  in WTP between Green party supporters  and Republicans for each principle is 
statistically significant  for three out of four principles. Finally, apart from the Green party 
supporters, the Americans seem to have very strong and homogenous preferences for the current 
emissions rule. 
4. Conclusions 
The negotiations on climate change have been halting at best and it is clear that national 
leaders  are nervous about making commitments that may turn out to be very expensive, 
particularly when they are unsure about the support of their citizenry. Among the many unsettled 
issues, we considered how the citizens of the United States and China feel about the allocation of 
emissions mitigation costs among different countries, not as a matter of attitudes, but as trade-
offs that will cost them money.  
In  our  choice experiment, we directed  the respondents to  choose allocation rules  (or 
burden-sharing rules), given a 60 percent reduction of emissions (with the same total reduction 
cost globally). We considered four primary burden-sharing rules in our analysis, according to 
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each country’s 1) historical emissions, 2) income (ability to pay), 3) equal right to emit per 
person (need), and 4) current emissions. The results from our study suggest there is considerable 
group-serving bias among both American and Chinese respondents, in that they strongly prefer 
rules that are advantageous to  their respective countries.  Because of the position of  these 
countries on historical versus current CO2 emissions, and with respect to economic development, 
the rules that these two groups favor are quite different. Specifically, the U.S. respondents prefer 
the current emissions rule, followed by the ability to pay and the historical emissions rule. The 
Chinese respondents, on the other hand, prefer the historical emissions rule, while the current 
emissions rule is the least preferred.  
We also investigated whether different respondent groups within each  country  have 
different preferences for the burden-sharing rules. We found that university-educated 
respondents in the United States have a higher WTP for the rule that favors their country and a 
lower WTP for the rule that is the most expensive for their country, compared to those with 
lower education. There is, at least for the moment, no sign that greater education would lead to a 
higher probability of reaching compromise. We also found that people with different political 
preferences in the United States clearly disagree in their ranking of the burden-sharing rules. 
In summary, respondents from both the United States and China prefer the rule that gives 
their country the most economic advantage, but the Chinese clearly care more about this. In fact, 
these rules have dramatically different consequences. These  differences  can be measured in 
terms of very large financial flows,  which  highlight  the difficulties countries have  finding 
agreement on the same rule. The fact that the Chinese and the U.S. respondents both chose the 
ability to pay rule as second best may, perhaps, give some faint hope and direction for coming 
climate negotiations and compromises.  
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Table A1     Global Emission Reduction, Temperature Increase, and Its Effects 
Global emissions 
reduction  85% reduction  60% reduction  30% reduction 
Temperature increase   2°F increase  3°F increase  4°F increase 
Harvest 
Harvests in countries near 
the equator decrease by 
4%–6%. Harvests in 
countries in the northern 
hemisphere increase by 
1%–3%. 
Harvests in countries near 
the equator decrease by 
10%–12%. Harvests in 
countries in the northern 
hemisphere are 
unaffected. 
Harvests in countries near 
the equator decrease by 
14%–16%. Harvests in 
the northern hemisphere 
decrease by 0%–2%. 
Increased flooding and 
storms  
Small tropical islands and 
lowland countries (e.g., 
Bangladesh), experience 
increased flooding and 
storms.  
Additional low-lying areas 
in the Americas, Asia, and 
Africa experience 
increased flooding and 
storms. 
Populous cities face 
increased flood risks from 
rivers and ocean storms. 
Existence of small island 
countries is threatened. 
Threatened ecosystems 
Sensitive ecosystems, 
such as coral reefs and 
the Arctic ecosystem, are 
threatened. 
Most coral reefs die. 
Additional sensitive 
ecosystems and species 
around the world are 
threatened. 
Sensitive and less-
sensitive ecosystems and 
species around the world 
are threatened. 
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Table A2     Example of Choice Set in the U.S. Survey 
Choice 1.  Choose between these two alternative ways of decreasing global emissions by 60 
percent: 
  Alternative 1  Alternative 2 
Distribution of cost   Share of the world income  Equal emissions per person 
Countries with high income 
and very high emissions (e.g., 





Countries with high income 
and high emissions (e.g., 





Countries with low income 
and medium emissions (e.g., 





Countries with low income 
and low emissions (e.g., 





Yearly (monthly) cost for your 
household until 2050  $ 336 (28)  $ 168 (14) 
            
I would choose:       □ Alternative 1  □ Alternative 2 
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Table A3     Random Parameter Logit with Household Characteristics and Attitudes 
    United States  China 
  Coeff.  Std. err.  Coeff.  Std. err. 
Random parameters           
Historical emissions    -0.117  0.106  0.998
***  0.265 
Need    -0.270
**  0.111  -0.755
***  0.222 
Ability to pay    0.206
*  0.118  1.191
***  0.246 
Fixed parameters         
Cost ×  Low-income  -0.014
***  0.001  -0.001
**  0.000 
  Medium income  -0.010
***  0.001  -0.002
***  0.000 
  High income  -0.007
***  0.001  -0.002
***  0.000 
Heterogeneity in means         
Historical emissions ×  Female  0.036  0.081  0.403
**  0.178 
  University education  -0.140  0.088  0.101  0.178 
  Use tax money in United 
States/China  0.119  0.087  -0.222  0.179 
  Own country should 
reduce  -0.010  0.104  -0.203  0.227 
  Temperature has 
increased  0.006  0.108  0.016  0.432 
Need ×  Female  0.053  0.085  -0.265
*  0.153 
  University education  -0.034  0.092  0.287
*  0.154 
  Use tax money in 
US/China  -0.132  0.091  0.278
*  0.155 
  Own country should 
reduce  0.198
*  0.109  0.208  0.195 
  Temperature has 
increased  -0.249
**  0.112  -0.141  0.383 
Ability to pay ×  Female  -0.013  0.090  -0.020  0.159 
  University education  -0.012  0.097  -0.209  0.162 
  Use tax money in 
US/China  -0.084  0.097  -0.306
*  0.162 
  Own country should 
reduce  -0.114  0.116  -0.509
**  0.211 
  Temperature has 
increased  0.086  0.120  0.566  0.418 
Standard deviations         
Historical emissions    0.105  0.291  2.259
***  0.204 
Need    0.144  0.206  1.762
***  0.180 
Ability to pay    0.390
***  0.078  1.894
***  0.185 
Pseudo R2    0.134    0.133   
No. of individuals    911    1264   
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No. of observations    3643    5056   
*,
 **,
 *** denote coefficient statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A4     Random Parameter Logit with Political Preferences for the United States 
 
      United States   
  Coeff.  Std. err. 
Random parameters     
Historical emissions    -0.171
**  0.080 
Need    -0.407
***  0.086 
Ability to pay    0.172
*  0.091 
Fixed parameters     
Cost ×  Low-income  -0.014
***  0.001 
  Medium income  -0.010
***  0.001 
  High income  -0.007
***  0.001 
Heterogeneity in means     
Historical emissions ×  Democrats  0.137  0.103 
  Independent  0.044  0.111 
  Green party  0.363  0.416 
  Other party  0.104  0.169 
Need ×  Democrats  0.287
***  0.109 
  Independent  0.209
*  0.116 
  Green party  1.284
***  0.463 
  Other party  0.044  0.170 
Ability to pay ×  Democrats  -0.194
*  0.117 
  Independent  -0.052  0.124 
  Green party  -0.747  0.462 
  Other party  0.175  0.179 
Standard deviations     
Historical emissions    0.073  0.390 
Need    0.126  0.232 
Ability to pay    0.384
***  0.077 
Pseudo R2    0.133   
No. of individuals    911   
No. of observations    3634   
Standard errors are in last column. 
*,
 **,
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